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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM IRA LEON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920150-CA 
Priority #2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for a Second Degree Felony, 
Theft, in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. Defendant entered a plea of not-guilty to the charge 
on the 3d day of January, 1992. On the 3d day of February, 1992, 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss based on his contention that he 
had timely filed a Demand for Disposition of Pending Charges and 
that the instant prosecution was coming to trial more than 120 days 
after that Demand. The District Court denied Defendant's Motion on 
the 4th day of February, 1992. The matter came before the District 
Court for jury trial on the 5th day of February, 1992. Defendant 
was convicted of the offense charged at that trial and was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not 
1 
less than one (1) year but not to exceed fifteen (15) years. Said 
sentence was to run concurrently with any sentence Defendant was 
then serving. A Notice of Appeal was filed on March 6, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
a. Was Defendants Notice requesting disposition of pending 
charges properly filed pursuant to Section 77-29-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended? 
b. If the aforesaid Notice was properly filed was it 
effective against the charges in this case? 
c. Should Defendant's aforesaid Motion to Dismiss have been 
granted thus preventing the outcome of this case which is now 
appealed from? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
A. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
B. Section 77-29-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended states: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment 
in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional 
institution of this state, and there is pending against 
the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or 
information, and the prisoner shall deliver t6 the 
warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any 
appropriate agent of the same, a written demand 
specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein 
2. 
it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending 
charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought 
to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of 
written notice* 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon 
receipt of the demand described in Subsection (1), shall 
immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal 
delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. 
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon 
request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide 
the attorney with such information concerning the term of 
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be 
requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in 
Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant 
or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with 
the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted 
any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial 
within 120 days, or within such continuance as has been 
granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss 
the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If 
the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting 
attorney to have the matter heard within the time 
required is not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or not, the 
court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly 
inform a prisoner in writing of the source and contents 
of any untried indictments or informations against that 
prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that 
prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition 
thereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with the crime of Theft, a 
First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. On December 16, 1991, a Preliminary 
Hearing was held in which the Circuit Court Judge determined that 
the State had met its burden of proof and had shown that there was 
3. 
probable cause to determined that the crime caused had taken place 
and that the Defendant had committed that crime • The Circuit Court 
Judge thus bound the matter over for arraignment in the District 
Court. The arraignment took place in District Court on the 3d day 
of January, 1992 and Defendant plead not guilty at that time. On 
the 3d day of February, 1992, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss 
based on his contention that he had timely filed a Demand for 
Disposition of Pending Charges on January 2, 1991 and that notice 
of that filing had been forwarded to the Utah County Clerk and the 
Utah County Attorney on January 14, 1991 and that trial of this 
matter was being held more than 120 days after that demand* The 
Utah County Attorney's office opposed Defendant's Motion on the 
grounds that Defendant's Notice had been deficient because there 
were no indictments or informations pending against the Defendant 
at the time of its filings and because the Notice did not specify 
the nature of any charge and the Court wherein the charge was 
pending. On February 4, 1992, the District Court Judge denied 
Defendant's Motion using almost the exact language of the Utah 
County Attorney's objection to Defendant's Motion. The matter then 
came before the District Court for Jury Trial on the 5th day of 
February, 1992. Defendant was convicted at that trial and was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not 
less than one (1) year but not to exceed fifteen (15) years. Said 
sentence was to run concurrently with any sentence Defendant was 
then serving. A notice of Appeal was filed on March, 6, 1992. 
4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Def' r ;TCE AND REQUEST FOR DI5POSM "ON 
OF PENDING CHARGES wh .-. ' • • i 1 1 eel out on J-inuar 
d e l i v e r e d * i t h o r i z c d <c|i I1- I'l jfi Muf. . . ^. 
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c h a r g i n g *- n i • »• mi« > i» i > > IN : uDmiss i on ui Defendant ' s 
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r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n t h a t Iv- cou ld o n t n M i h \h IPIHI.H I i| i l l m 
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of D e f e n d a n t ' s NOTICE and d i d not do r.o u n t i l some e iqh t months 
latf- t o gdi i i a t a c t i c a l advant?uir< o^,., w-f eni l< j r 11 inm In h a r a s s 
ARGUMENT 
JL. DEFENDANT1 S NOTICE A:.~ REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING 
CHARGES WAS PROPERLY DRAWN AND SUBMITTED. 
At t h e t imp f)etendril1 - i . te t 'c i i 1 hi ' " il. .! ilt» P r i s o n he WIT" 
ri WCI r i I p^  ii< 11 in i dliciryes (jgcjjiist him in b c l h .Salt Lake Counly rind 
Utah i o u n t y , h\ J anuary , l ' r J i , Defendant became aw<n i h e 
p r o c e s s i or r e q u e s t i pi| n i s p o / . i ' i'»" >»! i'vnd i M1) 1 n a r g e s and , u s i n g a 
11'Mil |.«i n v nle.1 lu 11. 1  nil by p r i s o n a u t h o r i t i e s s u b m i t t e d such a 
5. 
request. The request specified pending charges in both Utah and 
Salt Lake Counties and stated that the charges pending included 
Auto Theft, Armed Robbery and Burglary. The auto theft case is the 
case now under appeal. Defendant's NOTICE was then forwarded to 
the clerk of the 4th District Court and the Utah County Attorney on 
or about January 14, 1991, by prison authorities. The foregoing 
meets with specificity the requirements of U.C.A. S. 77-29-1. 
Subparagraph (1) of that Statute requires "a prisoner serving a 
term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or other penal or 
correctional institution of this state, and there is pending 
against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or 
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff 
or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the 
same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the 
court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the 
pending charge." The form provided to Defendant and submitted by 
him on or about January 2, 1991, meets all the above requirements 
of the Statute. 
Subparagraph (1) of the Statute requires "Any warden, sheriff 
or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand described in 
Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded 
by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, 
to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk." The 
delivery of Defendant's NOTICE to the Fourth District Court Clerk 
and the Utah County Attorney on January 14, 1991, meets all the 
6. 
r e q u i r e m e n t s . , of t h e S t a t u t e . 
T h u s , D e f e n d a n t ' s NOTrrp AND REQUEST F'"»p nispofMTION "U"l""' 
PENDIN %1- • iiiff" l\\ ' i I'I in 11 nil I mi ih I n o t i c e r e q u i r e m e n t s of 
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- i wcis p r o p e r l y f i l e d and s e r v e d . 
.DEFENDANT'S NOTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISPOSITIVE OF THIS 
CASE EVEN THOUGH AN ACTUAL INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION HAD 
NOT BEEN FILED CHARGING THIS CASE AT THE TIME OF THE 
SUBMISSION OF THAT NOTICE. 
i c u ^ ' - NOTICE AND REQUES* i 
DISPOSITION PENDING CHARGES wa^ , - > ^ 
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c h a r g e s m thjus c a s e . The C o u n t y A t t o r n e y c a l c u l a t e d tf ia1 r fie 
r : , ' t ; j of t h e c h a r q e n in t h i s* I M « I « i u i d ,^:r\n- n,- I In " ' r w i i i *:he 
••'-':• h ' i r * n i l ( i n i i i i i iirnj t i u i u e t e n d a n t w o u l d be unable* t o 
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o f a d e n i a l t o a s p e e d y t r i 1 !• i I i ,MI- H -. ' i" ' U n i t y 
7 . 
Attorney failed to file an Information formally charging the 
Defendant for some eleven months after he had actually prepared 
such an Information. The Defendant argued that such delay denied 
him a right to a speedy trial under the 6th amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. In State v. Smith the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
The Prosecutor is not required to file charges as soon as 
probable cause exists, to allow prosecutor to be reasonably 
satisfied that he will be able to establish suspects's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt; for preaccusation delay to 
constitute reversible error, delay must cause actual prejudice 
to defendant's case and result in tactical advantage for pro-
secutor. 
The standard thus set forth in Smith is satisfied by the facts 
in this case. Defendant was aware of the charges pending in this 
case and specifically listed them in his NOTICE. The County 
Attorney was reasonably certain of a conviction once the charges 
were filed and intentionally delayed that filing to gain a tactical 
advantage over Defendant. 
In the case of State v. Viles. 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The purpose of U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1 which states that prisoner 
serving a term of imprisonment is entitled to have charge brought 
to trial within 120 days of prisoner's delivery to custodial 
officer of written notice requesting disposition of pending charge 
is to protect the constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy 
trial and to compel law enforcement authorities to properly 
prosecute charges against prisoners. 
In this case Defendant waited more than a year to be brought 
to trial in this case after serving his NOTICE. This can in no way 
be considered a speedy trial. 
8. 
In i-nc ^ - ^ —P ~" i t e \ . P e t e r s e n I z . ^ a *_*
 V uUl i 1 9 9 1 ) , 
the Utah Supreme * * t-^ed: 
keveiod, i i aetexiaanfs convictions was required due to 
failure ot State to bring defendant to trial within 120 days 
of date •:>' deliver\ i i*r <\:t- nnice .t disposition, and 
fa^* +-*' * •-r— wa- * v*usc f.:r ""he delay, 
\-: i :here *. s s: :<*..s^  - * r*u i~ •-> -| tiling 
charges * *? ^r - *~-o * *" rvi > ,. County 
j w;.e woi . - * r s • J vantage. 
state v, Peterson the court i!-^ ho d thit: 
Defendants who are i lot brought to trial within 120 da'-"" ~f 
filing of notice of disposition have no burden of proving 
that they were prejudiced by delay or that prosecution was 
given tactical advantage to be enti tied to dismissal -** 
charges 
Even thornf"" statu v . Sim ill .«!' ' State v. Peterson seem to ho 
opposed wi tn reqard to the duty ot the Defendant to p? O V P preiudice 
MI tactical advantage •• »'bnini,i t M > ; mimi mM i u \\ state v. 
Peterson i« " ">< NM^M"! * < ", circa, jyyi ds (.apposed to State v. 
Smith, cir< i. Jc*8h. in either case it Is against the intprort' "f 
justice to ,illow ri prosecutor i«» takf » h HM OHS< • i oitali lo« ii< ijy that 
» MM nr-th rininfy i\i iniiity i MMK »n tiiis case atter Defendant fiJed 
Pi]'- NOTICE HF DISPOSITION. 
CONCLUSION 
in mi H i ",isi i in Defendant submitted a valid NOT1CK AND 
REQUEST FOh DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES to authorItiM ; 11 i he 
Utah State IT i son whin I-fit forwar il n |; i 11 tne i leik nf 
i i Hi i J Mi Ji't. i oounty Attorney, all 
pursuant to U.C.AP . .-_L? *. ^n^ ULQIA COUMI y Mfni'in y tniin 
9. 
waited an additional 8 months to file the charges resulting in this 
appeal. The County Attorney's delay was without any cause except 
to gain tactical advantage over the Defendant and thus to cause 
actual prejudice to Defendant's cause. Upon receipt of Defendant's 
NOTICE the prosecutor should have immediately filed the pending 
charges in this case or determined not to do so at all. Due to the 
prosecutor's failure to do so in the face of the Defendant's NOTICE 
the conviction in this case should be reversed and the case 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1992. 
DONALD E. ELKINS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 
day of September, 1992. 
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to conduct an investigation after a showing 
of good cause. It was thereafter the re-
sponsibility of the attorney general to 
"subpoena witnesses, compel their attend-
ance and testimony under oath before any 
certified court reporter, and require the 
production of books, papers, documents, re-
cordings and any other items which consti-
tute evidence or may be relevant to the 
investigation in the judgment of the attor-
ney general or county attorney." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-22-2(1) (1980) (emphasis 
added).3 Any venture beyond the realm of 
relevance or the parameters of the good 
cause affidavit is attributable to the attor-
ney general, not the magistrate. 
Similarly, the attorney general cannot be 
said to have reasonably relied on the legis-
lature's inadvertent abridgement of consti-
tutional rights. The statute at issue in 
Krull authorized warrantless administra-
tive searches and was declared unconstitu-
tional. In extending the good faith excep-
tion, the court reasoned: "Penalizing the 
officer for the [legislature's] error, rather 
than his own, cannot logically contribute to 
the deterrence of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions." Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350, 
107 S.Ct. 1160, 1167, 94 L.Ed.2d 364, 375 
(1987). 
The officer in Krull was "simply ful-
filling] his responsibility to enforce the 
statute as written." Id. The legislative 
grant of discretionary power to construe 
and implement the Subpoena Powers Act 
places the attorney general in a qualitative-
ly different position from a patrolman en-
forcing a vehicle code. As the state's high-
est law enforcement officer, the attorney 
general is expected to perform his discre-
tionary functions within constitutional 
bounds. To shield his conduct behind the 
vagueness of a legislative grant of authori-
ty would be tantamount to a grant of im-
munity to act unconstitutionally. We con-
clude that a good faith exception, even if it 
were adopted under our state constitution, 
would be inapplicable to illegal subpoenas 
3. Amended 1988 Utah Laws ch. 101, § 5; 1989 
Utah Laws ch. 123, § 1. 
4. The Supreme Court of Connecticut recently 
held that the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule was incompatible with its constitu-
issued to defendants' banks by the attor-
ney general, who is chargeable for the il-
legality. 
We leave for another day the issue of 
whether to apply in appropriate circum-
stances a good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule to article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution.4 
We remand to the district court with 
instructions to suppress all evidence ob-
tained from defendants' banks by illegal 
subpoenas. The convictions are reversed, 
and a new trial is ordered. 
HALL, C.J., concurs. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring): 
I concur in the opinion of Justice Howe. 
I write only to address the standing ques-
tion. Justice Howe implicitly accepts the 
argument that defendants have standing to 
raise the violation of their state constitu-
tional privacy interests in their bank 
records, even though the subpoenas which 
secured that evidence were not addressed 
to them. I would note explicitly for the 
benefit of the bench and bar that in so 
ruling, we are rejecting the arguments ad-
vanced by the State that we should follow 
federal standing law and deny those not 
directly subjected to the search any right 
to challenge its legality. See generally 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133, 99 
S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89, 96 
S.Ct. 3037, 3048-50, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). 
I find this entirely appropriate. Even 
where federal rights are at stake, standing 
law is state law, and we are not bound to 
follow federal precedent. Provo City 
Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456-57 
(Utah 1989). In the area of search and 
seizure, the federal courts have developed 
extraordinarily restrictive doctrines that 
have the effect, if not the purpose, of plac-
ing a large percentage of illegal activities 
beyond the scrutiny of the courts. See 
tion. State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 
58 (1990) In footnote 14 of that court's opin-
ion, cases from many states are listed on both 
sides of the question. 
STATE v. PETERSEN 
Cite as 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991) 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85, 2. Criminal Law ®=»577.10(10) 
100 S.Ct. 2547, 2549, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); 
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 
731-32, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2444, 65 L.Ed.2d 
468 (1980); United States v. Obregon, 748 
F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir.1984). I see no 
reason for us to follow suit, especially 
when state constitutional rights, which we 
have a peculiar obligation to protect, are at 
stake. 
Utah 421 
Defendant who files notice of disposi-
tion is not required to object to trial date in 
order to maintain his rights under statute 
requiring defendant to have charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of date of 
delivery of written notice of disposition. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3, 4). 
DURHAM, J.f concurs in the 
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
STEWART, 
follow. 
J., dissents; opinion will 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Bryon Dale PETERSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 900180. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 4, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted by jury of 
aggravated burglary, and two counts of 
attempted second-degree murder, before 
the Seventh District Court, Emery County, 
Boyd Bunnell, J., and court subsequently 
found defendant guilty of being habitual 
offender. Defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, C.J., held that reversal 
of defendant's convictions was required 
due to failure of State to bring defendant 
to trial within 120 days of date of delivery 
• of written notice of disposition, and fact 
that there was no good cause for the delay. 
Reversed, charges dismissed. 
1. Criminal Law «=> 1134(3) 
Questions of law are reviewed by the 
Supreme Court for correctness. 
3. Criminal Law <^577.10(4), 1134(3) 
Trial court's decision not to dismiss for 
failure to begin proceeding within 120 days 
after filing of notice of disposition and its 
decision to grant continuance are based on 
findings of good cause, and thus same 
standard of review should be applied. U.C. 
A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4); Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 52(a). 
4. Criminal Law «=»1134(3) 
Legal determinations concerning prop-
er interpretation of statute which grants 
trial court discretion are reviewed for cor-
rectness. 
5. Criminal Law «=>1158(1) 
Trial court's factual determinations 
will not be disturbed unless clearly errone-
ous. 
6. Criminal Law <&=>577.16(8) 
Defendants who are imL brought to 
trial within 120 days of filing of notice of 
disposition have nq jiurflen of proving that 
they were prejudiced by delay or that pros-
ecution was given tactical advantage to be 
entitled to dismissal of charges. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-29-1. 
7. Criminal Law «=>577.16(5) 
There was no reasonable continuance 
granted to toll statutory period for bring-
ing of case to trial after notice of disposi-
tion was filed; neither of the attorneys nor 
defendant requested or was granted contin-
uance. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3). 
fc 8. Criminal Law <3=>577.10(4) 
Good cause for failing to hold hearing 
within 120 days of inmate's filing of notice 
of disposition cannot be based on mere fact 
that delay was not caused by prosecutor. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3, 4). 
Tta 'i? -fAf L>'"t\l *-.*?<- '-Ax£ A (££\tAi'S> 
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9. Criminal Law <s»577.10(3) 
Delay in bringing inmate to trial within 
120 days of his filing of notice of disposi-
tion was not reasonable for specific pur-
pose of allowing defendant and his counsel 
time to resolve their conflicts; trial judge 
did not feel that delay was necessary to 
resolve conflict 34 days before date of trial 
when defendant's counsel sought to with-
draw due to continuing conflict, but rather 
court appointed cocounsel and did not con-
tinue trial. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-
1(3, 4). 
Keith H. Chiara, Price, and Allen S. 
Thorpe, Castle Dale, for defendant and ap-
pellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Bryon Dale Petersen appeals 
his convictions of aggravated burglary,1 a 
first degree felony; of two counts of at-
tempted second degree murder,2 both sec-
ond degree felonies;3 and of being a habit-
ual criminal.4 
On July 6, 1989, Petersen was charged 
with burglarizing the home of Ms. Lola 
Jewkes and attempting to murder Ms. 
Jewkes and her daughter. Petersen, hav-
ing been previously convicted and sen-
tenced to prison for felony offenses, at 
least one of which was a second degree 
felony, was also charged with possession of 
a firearm by a prohibited person 5 and with 
being a habitual criminal. On July 12, 
1989, Petersen, who was being held at the 
Utah State Prison pending a parole revoca-
tion hearing, filed a notice and request for 
disposition of pending charges ("notice of 
disposition"), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-29-1 (Supp.1989). The notice of dis-
position was filed with an authorized agent 
of the Utah State Prison. Section 77-29-
1(2) requires that any custodial officer, 
upon receipt of a notice of disposition, 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1) (Supp.1989). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203( 1 )(a) (Supp.1989). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp.1989). 
"shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded . . . to the appropriate prosecut-
ing attorney and court clerk." Section 77-
29-1(1) states that a prisoner is "entitled to 
have the charge brought to trial within 120 
days of the date of delivery of written 
notice." The Emery County Attorney re-
ceived a copy of the notice of disposition. 
However, for unknown reasons, no copy of 
the notice was found in the trial court's 
file. 
On July 27, 1989, the Emery County Pub-
lic Defender was appointed to represent 
Petersen. Petersen was arraigned on Sep-
tember 6, 1989, and at the arraignment, 
requested that the court appoint different 
counsel because of Petersen's dissatisfac-
tion with the public defender's handling of 
his case. Petersen's request for new coun-
sel was denied, and without objection, trial 
was set for February 15, 1990, 218 days 
after Petersen filed the notice of disposi-
tion. 
On January 5, 1990, Petersen's appointed 
counsel sought to withdraw from the case, 
claiming that he was not able to resolve 
continuing conflicts with his client. On 
January 12, 1990, the trial judge denied the 
motion to withdraw and appointed co-coun-
sel. When Petersen's new defense counsel 
learned that Petersen had filed a notice of 
disposition, a motion to dismiss was filed 
on the ground that Petersen was not 
brought to trial within 120 days of the 
delivery of the notice. On February 15, 
1990, a hearing was held and the motion to 
dismiss was denied. 
In dismissing the motion, the trial court 
found: (1) The county attorney had re-
ceived the notice of disposition, but the 
court had received no notice whatsoever. 
(2) The court asked Petersen whether the 
trial date was acceptable, and Petersen did 
not object to the date. (3) The trial date 
was set to allow time for defendant and his 
counsel to resolve their differences. (4) 
Petersen, as a result of having his parole 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp.1989). 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp.1989). 
revoked, has been incarcerated in the Utah 
State Prison since the filing of the charges. 
In its conclusions of law, the trial court 
ruled: (1) The setting of the trial date for 
February 15, 1990, occurred within the 
120-day period and was for the purpose of 
allowing time for Petersen and his counsel 
to resolve their differences and, therefore, 
constituted a continuance for good cause. 
(2) Petersen waived the statutory right to a 
trial within 120 days by not objecting to the 
trial date. (3) Petersen had the burden of 
showing that the failure to try his case 
before the expiration of the statutory peri-
od resulted in prejudice to his case or tacti-
cal advantage to the prosecutor. (4) Peter-
sen made no showing of prejudice or tacti-
cal advantage. (5) The delay was not 
caused by any action or inaction of the 
prosecutor. 
On February 15, 1990, the date of the 
trial, Petersen moved to disqualify the trial 
judge on the ground that the judge had 
previously, as a district attorney, prose-
cuted defendant and had recused himself 
from presiding over a trial of defendant in 
December of 1981. The court denied this 
motion on the ground that it was not timely 
made. 
The aggravated burglary charge and the 
two attempted murder charges were tried 
to a jury on February 15 and 16. The jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. 
Following the verdict, defendant waived a 
jury trial on the charge of being a habitual 
criminal. The court subsequently found 
defendant guilty of this charge. The 
charge of unauthorized possession of a 
handgun was dismissed. Petersen was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than five years nor more than life on 
each one of the four charges, such terms to 
run consecutively. 
6. See State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1374 
(Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071, 
1074 (Utah 1989); State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 
144-45 (Utah 1989) (all holding that the habitual 
criminal statute does not create a separate 
crime but operates as an enhancing statute); see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (Supp.1989) 
(second degree murder is a first degree felony); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp.1989) (at-
tempted second degree murder is a second de-
gree felony); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) 
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There are three issues presented on ap-
peal. First, Petersen claims that all his 
convictions should be reversed and all 
charges dismissed with prejudice due to the 
State's failure to bring him to trial within 
120 days of the date on which the notice of 
disposition was delivered to the county at-
torney. Second, Petersen claims that if 
this court does not dismiss the charges, he 
is entitled to a new trial on the grounds of 
bias and prejudice on the part of the trial 
judge. Third, the State, on its own motion, 
asserts that Petersen was improperly sen-
tenced and asks that the case be remanded 
for resentencing.6 
Petersen's claim that his convictions 
should be reversed and the charges against 
him dismissed with prejudice is based on 
section 77-29-1,7 which reads in pertinent 
part: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a 
term of imprisonment in the state prison 
. . . and there is pending against the pris-
oner in this state any untried indictment 
or information, and the prisoner shall 
cause to be delivered to the warden . . . 
or any appropriate agent of the same, a 
written demand specifying the nature of 
the charge and the court wherein it is 
pending and requesting disposition of the 
charge, he shall be entitled to have the 
charge brought to trial within 120 days 
of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(3) After written demand is delivered 
as required in Subsection (1), the prose-
cuting attorney or the defendant or his 
counsel, for good cause shown in open 
court, with the prisoner or his counsel 
being present, may be granted any rea-
sonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not 
brought to trial within 120 days, or with-
(Supp.1989) (second degree felony is punishable 
by an indeterminate period of not less than one 
nor more than fifteen years). 
7. Petersen does not claim that his constitutional 
rights to a speedy trial were violated. See U.S. 
Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The 
right afforded by the Utah Constitution is also 
guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(f) 
(Supp.1989). 
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in such continuance as has been granted, 
and the defendant or his counsel moves 
to dismiss the action, the court shall re-
view the proceeding. If the court finds 
that the failure of the prosecuting attor-
ney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good 
cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court 
shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. y 
[1] The threshold issue, in determining 
whether Petersen's convictions should be 
reversed pursuant to section 77-29-1, is 
whether the trial court erred in ruling that 
Petersen waived his rights under the stat-
ute by not objecting to the trial date. 
Whether criminal defendants, after filing 
notices of disposition, are required to af-
firmatively assert their rights under sec-
tion 77-29-1 is a question of statutory con-
struction and, therefore, a question of law. 
Questions of law are reviewed for correct-
ness.8 
[2] This court has held that criminal 
defendants have no such duty to object 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-65-1 to -2 
(Supp.1953) (amended 1980), the predeces-
sor to section 77-29-1.9 In so holding, we 
stated, "[I]t is apparent that the legislature 
intended to place the burden of complying 
with the statute on the prosecutor." ,0 The 
language in section 77-29-1 compels the 
same conclusion. Section 77-29-1(4) 
states, "If the court finds that the failure 
of the prosecuting attorney to have the 
matter heard within the time required is 
not supported by good cause . . . the court 
shall order the matter dismissed with preju-
dice." n This language clearly places the 
burden of complying with the statute on 
the prosecutor. Therefore, Petersen, after 
8. E.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (statutory construction 
is a question of law which is reviewed for cor-
rectness); Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d 
933, 934 (Utah 1988) (statutory construction is a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correct-
ness). 
9. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158, 
160 (1969). 
filing his notice of disposition, was not re-
quired to object to the trial date in order to 
maintain his rights under section 77-29-1. 
[3] Since Petersen did not waive his 
rights, the determination of whether his 
convictions should be reversed is dependent 
on whether, in accordance with section 77-
29-1(3), a "reasonable continuance" was 
granted for "good cause shown" or wheth-
er, in accordance with section 77-29-1(4), 
the trial judge properly found that the 
"failure of the prosecuting attorney to 
have the matter heard within the time re-
quired is supported by good cause." Be-
fore reaching these questions, however, it 
is important to note that we have interpret- ^ 
ed both section 77-29-1 and its predecessor 
as granting discretion to the trial court.12 
Specifically, in State v. Bonny 13 we held 
that sections 77-65-1 to -2 (1953) (amended 
1980) granted trial courts the authority to 
make reasonable determinations concern-
ing the existence of good cause. 
"[F]or a good cause shown in open 
court ... the court having jurisdiction 
in the matter may grant any necessary 
or reasonable continuance." The em-
phasized language of the statute just 
quoted makes it clear that if there is a 
reasonable basis in the record to support 
the proposition that the trial court grant-
ed a continuance "for good cause shown" 
it was within [the trial court's] discretion 
and authority to do so.14 
In stating this standard of review, the 
court relied on language that is consonant 
with the language of section 77-29-1(3); 
accordingly, the same standard should ap-
ply to the present statute. Although the 
predecessor to section 77-29-1 did not have 
a provision parallel to section 77-29-1(4), 
the decision not to dismiss under section 
11. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (emphasis add-
ed). 
12. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 
1982) (per curiam) (interpreting section 77-29-
1); State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147, 
147-48 (1970) (interpreting section 77-65-1). 
13. 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970). 
10. Id. 14. Id, 477 P.2d at 147-48 (emphasis in original). 
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77-29-1(4) is based on a finding of "good 
cause," as is the decision to grant a contin-
uance under section 77-29-1(3). Therefore, 
the same standard of review should be 
applied to both subsections 77-29-1(3) and 
<4).'5 
[4,5] Before reviewing the record to de-
termine if there is a reasonable basis for 
the trial court's judgment, however, it is 
necessary to make primary determinations 
concerning the content of the record. It is 
to be noted that trial courts do not have 
discretion to misapply the law.16 There-
fore, legal determinations concerning the 
proper interpretation of the statute which 
grants the trial court discretion are re-
viewed for correctness.17 Similarly, the tri-
al court's factual determinations will not be 
disturbed unless clearly erroneous.18 It is 
only after these primary determinations 
are made that the record can be reviewed 
for the existence of a reasonable basis for 
the proposition that good cause existed for 
the continuance or the delay. 
[6] The record supports the trial court's 
factual findings. In its conclusions of law, 
however, the trial court erred in rulings 
concerning the correct interpretation and 
application of section 77-29-1. Specifical-
ly, the trial court ruled that under section 
77-29-1, Petersen had the burden of prov-
ing that the delay prejudiced his case or 
gave the prosecution a tactical advantage. 
Although the fact that the delay works to 
the disadvantage of a defendant may be a 
15. See State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d at 405. 
16. See 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 772 
(1962); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 111 (1957). 
17. See Hancock v. Planned Development Corp., 
791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) (trial court does 
not have discretion to grant new trial absent 
one of the grounds specified in the rule); Tan-
garo v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390, 
391 n. 2 (1964) (trial court does not have discre-
tion to grant new trial absent one of the 
grounds specified in the rule); 5 Am.Jur.2d Ap-
peal and Error § 772 (1962) (trial court has no 
discretion to misapply the law); 4 C.J.S. Appeal 
and Error § 111 (1957) (trial court has no dis-
cretion on question of own power); see also, 
e.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (statutory construction 
reason for not finding "good cause," noth-
ing in section 77-29-1, its predecessor, or 
any of the case law under either statute 
requires a showing of prejudice in order for 
the charges against a defendant to be dis-
missed. On the contrary, section 77-29-1 
clearly provides that if there is not good 
cause for the delay, the court shall order 
the matter dismissed. The statute makes 
no mention of the effect of the delay. The 
only support the State cites for the trial 
court's position is a case dealing with &#"**) 
constitutional right to a speedy t r i a l t ^ 
However, we have never used the same 
approach in cases decided under section 
77-29-1 or its predecessor as we have used 
in constitutional cases^°y The conclusion 
that Petersen did not carry his burden of 
showing prejudice, therefore, cannot be 
used to support the finding of good cause. 
I7J It is also to be noted that the trial 
court erred in ruling that a reasonable con-
tinuance was granted tolling the statutory 
period. Section 77-29-1(3) sets out require-
ments that must be met before trial judges, 
in their discretion, may grant continuances 
that toll the time in which a defendant 
must be tried under section 77-29-1. This 
section provides that "the prosecuting at-
torney or the defendant or his counsel . . . 
may be granted any reasonable continu-
ance." It is clear from the record that 
neither of the attorneys nor defendant re-
quested or was granted a continuance. 
The requirements of the statute not being 
is a question of law which is reviewed for cor-
rectness); Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d 
933, 934 (Utah 1988) (statutory construction is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correct-
ness). See generally State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 
361, 453 P.2d 158, 160 (1969) (supreme court 
interprets sections 77-65-1 to -2 (1953) (amend-
ed 1980) and grants no deference to trial court's 
ruling). 
18. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Sweeney Land Co. v. 
Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990). 
19. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1327-31 (Utah 
1986). 
20. See State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d 
274, 276 (1972) (rights under section 77-65-2 
(amended 1980) are distinct from constitutional 
rights to speedy trial). 
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met, the trial court erred in concluding that 
a continuance was granted under section 
77-29-1(3). 
This fact, however, is not fatal to State's 
case. Section 77-29-1(4) states that if a 
motion to dismiss is brought, the trial court 
shall review the proceedings. "If the court 
finds that the failure of the prosecuting 
attorney to have the matter heard within 
the time required is not supported by good 
cause, whether a previous motion for con-
tinuance was made or not, the court shall 
order the matter dismissed with prejudice." 
This language makes it clear that it is the 
finding of good cause that is dispositive 
and not the actual granting of a continu-
ance. The court did find that there was 
good cause for the delay in that the trial 
was set to allow time for defendant and his 
counsel to resolve their differences. The 
finding of good cause is also supported by 
the court's conclusion that the delay was 
not caused by an action or inaction of the 
prosecutor. 
[8] As the State points out, this court 
has upheld trial court findings of good 
cause that were supported, at least in part, 
by the fact that the delay was not caused 
by action or inaction of the prosecutor.21 
However, this factor alone has never been 
considered dispositive. In the past, we 
have reversed a trial court's decision not to 
dismiss, notwithstanding the fact that the 
delay was not caused by the prosecutor.22 
Furthermore, in the cases cited by the 
State, there are other reasons for the find-
ing of good cause, such as a request on the 
part of the defense for a continuance23 
21. See State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348. 349 (Utah 
1985) (concerning the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (Supp. 
1984)); State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 
1985); State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 
1982) (per curiam); State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d 
115, 116 (Utah 1982). 
22. See State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 
158, 159-60 (1969). Although Wilson was decid-
ed under the previous statute, as noted above 
the standard for allowing a case to be tried 
beyond the required time, good cause, is the 
same under both statutes. 
23. State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d at 349; State v. 
Buttock, 699 P.2d at 756; State v. Velasquez, 641 
P.2d at 116. 
and/or a relatively short delay caused by 
unforeseen problems arising immediately 
prior to trial.24 In any event, to hold that 
good cause is supported by the lone fact 
that the delay was not caused by the prose-
cutor would contradict the language in sec-
tion 77-29-1(4) which places the burden of 
complying with the statute on the prosecu-
tion. 
[9] It is necessary, therefore, to exam-
ine the trial court's conclusion that the 
delay was reasonable because it was for 
the specific purpose of allowing defendant 
and his counsel time to resolve their con-
flicts. In some circumstances, conflicts be-
tween defendants and their counsel may 
justify delay. It is to be noted, however, 
that in the instant case the trial court be-
came aware of the problems 57 days after 
the notice of disposition was filed. Argu-
ably, this problem could have been resolved 
within the time allotted by the statute. 
Indeed, a review of the record makes it 
clear that the trial judge did not feel that 
such a delay was necessary. When Peter-
sen's counsel, due to continuing conflicts, 
sought to withdraw 34 days prior to trial, 
the court denied the motion, appointed co-
counsel, and did not continue the trial. In 
the order appointing co-counsel, the court 
stated that it did "not wish to delay the 
trial because of any such conflict." Since a 
delay was not necessary to resolve the 
conflict 34 days before the date of trial, a 
fortiori, a delay was not necessary to re-
solve the conflict approximately 63 days 
before the running of the statutory peri-
od.25 
24. State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d at 756; State v. 
Trujillo, 656 P.2d at 405. 
25. The statute requires that a defendant be tried 
within 120 days of the time the notice is deliv-
ered, not filed. See § 77-29-1(1); see also State 
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 312-13 (Utah 1975) 
(dealing with section 77-65-2). Since the 
record does not reveal when the notice of dispo-
sition was delivered to the county attorney, it is 
impossible to determine the exact date the statu-
tory period ran. However, nothing in the 
record indicates that the notice of disposition 
was not delivered within a reasonable time as 
required by the statute. See § 77-29-1(2); see 
also State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d at 312-13. 
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It should also be noted that there was a 
long delay inasmuch as the trial date was 
set for 218 days beyond the time defendant 
filed the notice of disposition. Given the 
fact that the record reveals that the trial 
court felt the delay was unnecessary, such 
a long delay cannot be considered reason-
able. The conclusion that the delay was 
for the purpose of allowing time for defen-
dant and his counsel to resolve their con-
flicts, therefore, cannot be used to support 
a reasonable basis for the finding of good 
cause. 
The State contends that in State v. Bull-
ock, 26 this court upheld a finding of good 
cause under similar facts. Bullock, how-
ever, is easily distinguishable from the in-
stant case. First, in Bullock the defense 
counsel moved for a continuance because 
he was ill on the date of trial.27 In the 
instant case, there was no motion for a 
continuance and the conflict did not arise 
shortly before trial. Second, in Bullock 
the continuance only delayed the trial 13 
days beyond the original trial date.28 In 
the instant case, the trial was delayed over 
90 days from the running of the statutory 
period. A review of the proceeding, there-
fore, does not reveal a reasonable basis for 
the finding of good cause. Accordingly, 
pursuant to section 77-29-1, Petersen's 
convictions should be reversed and the 
charges against him dismissed with preju-
dice. 
Due to our holding regarding section 77-
29-1, we do not reach the other issues in 
the case. However, we feel compelled to 
again comment on the propriety of trial 
judges' presiding over criminal trials when 
they have previously prosecuted the defen-
dants. In State v. Neeley, w a case that 
also dealt with a judge who presided over a 
trial of a defendant whom he had previous-
ly prosecuted, we stated: 
26. 699 P.2d 753 (Utah 1985). 
27. Id. at 756. 
28. Id. In Bullock, there was no record of the 
delivery of the notice of disposition. Therefore, 
it is impossible to determine how much time 
passed between the delivery of the notice and 
the trial. 
[A] judge should recuse himself when 
his "impartiality" might reasonably be 
questioned. Utah Code of Judicial Con-
duct 3(C)(1)(b) (1981). This standard set 
forth by the Code of Judicial Conduct 
should be given careful consideration by 
the trial judge. It may require recusal in 
instances where no actual bias is 
shown [T]he integrity of the judicial 
system should be protected against any 
taint of suspicion.. . . [W]e recommend 
the practice that a judge recuse himself 
where there is a colorable claim of bias 
or prejudice 30 
We went on to hold that although judges 
should recuse themselves if there are color-
able claims of bias or prejudice, absent a 
showing of actual bias, "failure to do so 
does not constitute reversible error as long 
as the requirements of section 77-35-29 
[current version at Utah R.Crim.P. 29] have 
been met."3 I 
The instant case, however, is more trou-
bling than Neeley. In this case, the trial 
judge, upon receiving the affidavit alleging 
prejudice, did not have a second judge rule 
on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit as 
required by rule 29(d), but summarily dis-
missed the motion on the ground that it 
was untimely. We are aware of the prob-
lems that arise when motions to disqualify 
are filed the day of trial and stress that we 
are not deciding the issue of whether the 
requirements of rule 29 must be complied 
with under such circumstances. However, 
because the motion to disqualify was sum-
marily dismissed, we are without a record 
sufficient to enable us to determine wheth-
er the affidavit was filed "as soon as prac-
tical" and "in good faith" as required by 
rule 29(c). It is also to be observed that, 
assuming the trial judge was aware of his 
prior contact with Petersen, the problem 
could have been avoided had the judge fol-
lowed our recommendation in Neeley and, 
29. 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988). 
30. Id. at 1094 (emphasis in original). 
31. Id. at 1094-95. 
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on his own motion, recused himself due to 
the colorable claim of prejudice. 
Pursuant to our holding regarding sec-
tion 77-29-1, the convictions are reversed 
and the charges are dismissed with preju-
dice. 
IOWE, A.C.J., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
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In a divorce action, the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David S. Young, 
J., entered a divorce decree and awarded 
joint legal custody of the parties' child, 
child support, alimony and property divi-
sion. Wife appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) amend-
ments to child custody statute deleting re-
buttable presumption favoring joint legal 
custody was a substantial and substantive 
amendment and thus could not be applied 
retroactively; (2) court abused discretion in 
imposing joint legal custody on parents 
without statutorily required parental 
agreement; (3) findings were inadequate to 
support child custody award; (4) child sup-
port award had to be reconsidered includ-
ing income from nonearned sources and 
husband's current earnings in making cal-
culations; and (5) wife was entitled to ali-
mony of $800 per month on a permanent 
basis, rather than for only one year. 
Remanded in part, modified in part and 
otherwise affirmed. 
1. Parent and Child <£=»3.3(1) 
Amendments to child custody statute 
deleting rebuttable presumption favoring 
joint legal custody was a substantial and 
substantive amendment and thus could not 
be applied retroactively. U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-10.2. 
2. Divorce <S=>299 
Trial court abused its discretion in im-
posing order of joint legal custody on par-
ents and child without statutorily required 
parental agreement and in the face of pa-
rental opposition. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.1 to 
30-3-10.4. 
3. Divorce <3=>301 
Findings were inadequate to support 
child custody award where court utilized 
best interest factors related to joint legal 
custody, not those related to child custody, 
findings were in conflict as to whether 
court or parents should determine visita-
tion rights, findings did not support award 
of any physical custody, and custody was 
awarded on the basis of court imposed visi-
tation time allocation. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-
10, 30-3-10.2(3). 
4. Divorce <3=>306 
In determining appropriate child sup-
port award, parental income had to include 
consideration of income from nonearned 
sources, as well as current earnings of 
husband, rather than average of husband's 
earned income over several years. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-45-7.4, 78-45-7.5, 78-45-7.5(l)(a), 
(5)(b), 78-45-7.5 to 78-45-7.7. 
5. Divorce <s=>240(2) 
Award of $800 alimony to wife on a 
permanent basis, rather than for only one 
year, was warranted based on considera-
tion of wife's earning capacity as a full-
time pharmacist and her necessary monthly 
living expenses, and husband's current 
gross capacity and his actual and necessary 
monthly living expenses. 
THRONSON v. 
CHe as 810 P.2d 428 
Paul H. Liapis (argued), Helen E. Chris-
tian, Kim M. Luhn, Gustin, Green, Stegall 
& Liapis, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
Clark W. Sessions (argued), Dean C. An-
dreasen, Campbell, Maack & Sessions, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellee. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Mary Thronson appeals provisions of a 
divorce decree and separate order award-
ing joint legal custody of a child, child 
support, alimony, and property. We re-
mand for further proceedings regarding 
child custody and support. We modify the 
alimony award and affirm the remainder of 
the decree. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on September 
30, 1978. Their marriage was the first for 
both. She was a full-time pharmacist and 
he a full-time attorney. A son was born to 
them on September 11, 1981. She became 
the child's primary caretaker and a part-
time pharmacist. He became a shareholder 
in his law firm. She filed a complaint for 
divorce. He filed a counterclaim for di-
vorce. They were divorced by a decree 
entered June 23, 1989. A separate order of 
joint legal custody was also entered. Fur-
1. Custody terminology: Many legislators, judges 
and writers have been loose with their "joint" 
custody language. Early articles identified this 
vexing problem as follows: 
Both the forms of custody [sole, divided, split, 
joint] following divorce and the terms which 
describe them are vague and overlapping. 
The lack of standard definitions and the 
courts' tendency to use certain terms inter-
changeably have created confusion. 
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children 
Following Divorce, 12 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 523, 525 
(1979). 
Often, when referring to one of these custody 
arrangements, courts use vague language or 
inadequately defined terms. 
Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky.L.J. 271, 283 (1978-
79). 
THRONSON Utah 4 2 9 
(UtahApp. 1991) 
ther relevant facts will be set forth below 
in our treatment of the respective issues. 
CHILD CUSTODY AWARD 
Ms. Thronson challenges the joint legal 
custody decree and order on two grounds: 
(1) She did not agree to the order of joint 
legal custody and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10.2 (1989) required the agreement 
of both parents at the time of this decree 
and order. (2) The provision for an auto-
matic award of sole custody to one parent 
when the other moves from the state was 
CHILD CUSTODY IN UTAH 
Prior to 1988, Utah did not have a statute 
expressly authorizing an award of "joint 
legal custody" l of a child. Our divorce 
statutes have contained various child custo-
dy provisions since 1903. For many years 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989) has autho-
rized district courts to include in divorce 
decrees "equitable orders relating to the 
children, property and parties." Further, 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 has contained 
various specific provisions regarding 
factors to be considered in awarding sole 
custody of a child. See Lembach v. Cox, 
639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981); 1 Utah L.Rev. 
363 (1989) (historical development of child 
custody factors and preferences in Utah). 
"Joint Legal Custody" was specifically 
added to the sole custody statute in 1988, 
and designated as § 30-3-10.1 to -10.4. 
We emphasize that this is a joint "legal" 
custody statute and not a joint "physical" 
One author points out that considerable se-
mantic confusion has resulted possibly because 
the "term" joint custody predates the "concept" 
of joint custody as it is known today. He states: 
"I have encountered at least fifteen terms used 
to refer to various alternatives to sole custody: 
joint legal custody, joint physical custody, divid-
ed custody, separate custody, alternating custo-
dy, split custody, managing conservatorship, 
possessory conservatorship, equal custody, 
shared custody, partial custody, custody 'given 
to neither party to the exclusion of the other,' 
temporary custody, shifting custody, and con-
current custody." Miller, Joint Custody, 13(3) 
Fam.L.Q. 345, 360 n. 79 (1979). 
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Subsection (3) following immediately af-
ter can be seen to be relating to and modi-
fying subsection (2). The intent can thus 
be seen to be that counties bear the costs 
of incarcerating persons charged with or 
convicted of crimes arising in the county 
and prosecuted by the county attorney. 
The defendants, however, argue that the 
provision of section 17-22-8 which requires 
the county to pay expenses incurred in 
incarcerating prisoners, except those pris-
oners who are prisoners under civil process 
(§ 17-22-10) and state felons who are sen-
tenced to serve in the county jail (§ 17-22-
8.5), limit the county from collecting ex-
penses from any other entity. However, 
the cities admit that section 17-22-9 (feder-
al prisoners) and section 10-13-23 (town 
prisoners), neither of which is mentioned in 
section 17-22-8, require that the county be 
compensated for the expense of boarding 
those prisoners. Therefore, it is only rea-
sonable that the cities also could be re-
quired to compensate the county for incar-
ceration of city prisoners even though such 
a requirement is not specifically mentioned 
in section 17-22-8. 
The judgment is, therefore, affirmed. 
STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
The STATE of Utah, By and Through 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF SO-
CIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Appel-
lant, 
v. 
Tirso TOLEDO, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 20059. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 12, 1985. 
State brought action against putative 
father of child born out of wedlock to ob-
tain reimbursement of public funds expend-
ed for support of child. On putative fa-
ther's motion, the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., dis-
missed complaint for failure to join indis-
pensable party. State appealed, and the 
Supreme Court held that child's mother 
was not indispensable party required to be 
joined by State. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
Mother of child born out of wedlock 
was not indispensable party in action by 
State against putative father to obtain re-
imbursement of public funds expended for 
support of child. U.C.A. 1953, 78-45a-5(2), 
78-45b-3, 78-45b-3(2); Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 19(a). 
2. Social Security and Public Welfare 
Where putative father moved to join 
mother as party in State's action to obtain 
reimbursement of funds expended for child 
support, and State stipulated that it had no 
objection, putative father could not obtain 
dismissal of complaint for State's failure to 
join mother, even assuming she was indis-
pensable party. U.C.A. 1953, 78-45a-l et 
seq. 
Ted Cannon, Co. Atty., Sandy Mooy, 
Asst. Co. Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Tirso Toledo, pro se. 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from an order of the 
district court dismissing plaintiffs com-
plaint for failure to join an indispensable 
party. 
Utah 711 
By accepting sup-
port on behalf of her child, the mother has 
assigned to plaintiff the right to collect 
support. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-45b-3. 
Hence, although the child's mother may be 
a necessary witness, she is not an indis-
pensable party.4 
[2] Finally, for even a broader reason, 
dismissal in the instant case was not war-
ranted. Defendant moved to join the moth-
er as a party, and the plaintiff stipulated 
Having indicated 
that he would join the mother, defendant 
cannot fairly argue that the complaint 
should be dismissed for plaintiffs failure 
to join the mother. 
The order of dismissal is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for trial. No costs 
awarded. 
f KErNUMMR 
, 2 j T ^ 1 * * * 
STATE v. SMITH 
Cite M 699 PJ2d 711 (Utah 1985) 
plaintiff brought this action under the share a joint interest. 
Uniform Act on Paternity l to obtain reim-
bursement of public funds expended for 
the support of a minor child. The com-
plaint was supported by an affidavit of the 
child's mother naming defendant as the 
child's father. Defendant filed an answer 
denying paternity. After discovery (includ-
ing blood tests), the matter was certified 
for trial. Thereafter, defendant moved to 
join the child's mother as an indispensable 
nartv and plaintiff stipulated that it had no " "° " F ? . . . . p«Hty, r . . • • n r J A. I * that it had no objection, 
objection to the joinder.1 Defendant later J 
moved to dismiss the complaint on the 
ground that plaintiff had failed to join an 
indispensable party—the child's mother. 
The trial court granted defendant's motion, 
and plaintiff appealed.3 
[1] U.C.A., 1953, § 78-45a-2 provides 
that "[pjaternity may be determined upon 
the petition of the mother, child, or the 
public authority chargeable by law with the 
support of the child." Of similar import is 
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-45a-5(2), which specifi-
cally provides that "the state department 
of social services may proceed on behalf of 
the obligee or in its own behalf pursuant to 
the provisions of chapter 45b of this title to 
enforce that right of support against the 
obligor." A pertinent provision of chapter 
45b (U.C.A., 1953, § 78-45b-3(2)) provides 
that "[f]or purposes of prosecuting any 
action pursuant to this act, the department 
shall be deemed a real party in interest 
upon the payment of any support." Plain-
tiff in the instant case is therefore statuto-
rily authorized to proceed solely on its own 
behalf. 
Nothing in our Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires a contrary result. Utah R.Civ.P. 
19(a) provides that "persons having a joint 
interest shall be made parties and be 
joined—" In the instant case, however, 
Plaintiff and the child's mother do not 
*• U.C.A., 1953, § 78-45a-l, et seq. 
'
n i t s
 brief on appeal, plaintiff represents that 
defendant's motion was granted at an unreport-
ed hearing. For the purposes of this appeal, we 
will assume the motion was never ruled upon 
«nce there is nothing in the record to indicate 
either a grant or a denial of the motion. 
SYSHM> 
***** 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Robert Steven SMITH, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 19053. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 13, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, David B. 
Dee, J., of attempted burglary and robbery, 
and defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court held that: (1) defendant's speedy tri-
al right did not attach at time of imprison-
3. Defendant has elected not to file a brief on 
appeal. 
4. See Provident Bank v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 
88 S.Ct. 733, 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (1968). 
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ment, and (2) defendant's speedy trial 
rights were not violated by prosecutor's 
delay in filing information. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law «=»577.9 
Defendant's speedy trial right did not 
attach at time of incarceration where incar-
ceration was for a parole violation, rather 
than for the new charges. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 6. 
•-. 2. Indictment and Information <s=>4.5 
Prosecutor is not required to file 
charges as soon as probable cause exists, 
to allow prosecutor to be reasonably satis-
fied that he will be able to establish sus-
pect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; for 
preaccusation delay to constitute reversible 
error, delay must cause actual prejudice to 
defendant's case and result in tactical ad-
vantage for prosecutor. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amends. 5, 6. 
3. Indictment and Information <s=>4.5 
Vacation time of a prosecutor in a mul-
tiple prosecutor office is not a valid excuse 
for failing to speedily file charges. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
4. Indictment and Information «=>42 
Where prosecutor obtained no tactical 
advantage over defendant because of one-
month delay in filing information prepared 
but not filed until after prosecutor's vaca-
tion, or other delays resulting in a total 
delay of approximately 11 months after 
demand for disposition of detainer, delay 
did not violate defendant's right to reason-
ably prompt filing of the charges against 
him. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 6; U.C.A. 
1953, 77-29-1. 
Thomas McCormick, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Ste-
phen Mikita, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger Blay-
lock, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and re-
spondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
The defendant was convicted of the 
crimes of attempted burglary and robbery 
which he committed while he was on a 
work release program from the Utah State 
Prison. He argues on appeal that the con-
viction should be reversed because he was 
denied a speedy trial. The information was 
not filed until eleven months after he was 
reincarcerated for violating parole. We af-
firm. 
The defendant, Robert Steven Smith, had 
been committed to the Utah State Prison 
and subsequently transferred to a half-way 
house on work release status. On October 
15, 1981, the police arrested the defendant 
for being in violation of his half-way house 
status because he was at a location not 
related to his work release, he was with 
people he was not supposed to be with, and 
it was suspected that he was involved in a 
conspiracy to commit a robbery. 
From October 1981 to March or April 
1982, the police sought evidence to corrob-
orate the statements of witnesses to the 
attempted robbery. Defendant's case was 
investigated along with some others involv-
ing a related group of perpetrators, against 
whom the county attorney intended to file 
charges at the same time. The defendant 
filed a demand for disposition of detainer in 
late October, 1981. See U.C.A., 1953, sec-
tion 77-29-1. Investigation of the cases 
continued after March or April, 1982, but 
no new evidence related to defendant's case 
was obtained. 
In July 1982, the county attorney pre-
pared an information charging the defend-
ant with attempted robbery and burglary. 
Since he planned to go on vacation from 
August 20 through September 6, 1982, the 
county attorney did not file the information 
until September 7, 1982, to avoid having 
other prosecutors unfamiliar with the case 
handle the preliminary hearing. The de-
fendant argues that the eleven-month delay 
from arrest to trial violated his right to a 
speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. 
STATE v. SMITH 
Cite MM 699 PM 711 (Utah 1985) 
Utah 713 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial" 1° United States v. Marion, 404 
US.' 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 
(1971), the Supreme Court held that the 
"speedy trial provision has no application 
until the putative defendant in some way 
becomes an 'accused.' " Id. at 313, 92 S.Ct. 
at 459. In that case, the defendants were 
indicted in 1970 for acts occurring between 
1965 and 1966. They argued that the pre-
accusation delay between the last alleged 
criminal act and the indictment violated 
their Sixth Amendment right. The United 
States Supreme Court rejected the conten-
tion, stating that "it is either a formal 
indictment or information or else the actual 
restraints imposed by arrest and holding to 
answer a criminal charge that engage the 
particular protections of the speedy trial 
provision of Sixth Amendment." Id. at 
320, 92 S.Ct. at 463. The Court reasoned 
that until either indictment or arrest oc-
curs, "a citizen suffers no restraints on his 
liberty and is not the subject of public 
accusations; his situation does not compare 
with that of a defendant who has been 
arrested and held to answer." Id. at 321, 
92 S.Ct. at 463. 
[1J In this case, the defendant was ar-
rested in October 1981 for violation of his 
work release status and conspiracy to com-
mit robbery. His subsequent imprison-
ment was not for the purpose of insuring 
his appearance at the trial for the robbery 
and attempted burglary charges. Rather, 
the reincarceration was for his violation of 
the conditions of parole. Since his impris-
onment was for a parole violation, his 
speedy trial right did not attach at the time 
of his reincarceration. Cf. State v. Dud-
l
*V, Me., 433 A.2d 711 (1981) (time served 
for probation violation not counted in 
speedy trial analysis); Mackey v. State, 279 
Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983) and State v. 
Ogden, 21 Wash.App. 44, 584 P.2d 957 
<l9?8) (time served for parole violation not 
punted for purposes of speedy trial stat-
ute); United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 
f^9 (9th Cir.1976) and United States v. 
We, 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir.1976) (adminis-
trative segregation within prison does not 
amount to arrest for Sixth Amendment 
purposes). 
The defendant also argues that his right 
to due process was violated by the prosecu-
tor's failure to file the charges promptly. 
He relies on United States v. Lovasco, 431 
U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 
(1977) which addressed the relationship be-
tween the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the Speedy Trial Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment when the prosecutor 
delays filing charges of criminal conduct. 
The Court held that when a prosecutor 
delays filing an indictment, the delay does 
not constitute a violation of due process 
unless there is a showing that the prosecu-
tor's delay "violates those 'fundamental 
conceptions of justice which lie at the base 
of our civil and political institutions,' and 
which define 'the community's sense of fair 
play and decency.'" Id. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 
2048 (citations omitted). "[PJrosecutors 
are under no duty to file charges as soon 
as probable cause exists but before they 
are satisfied they will be able to establish 
the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id. at 791, 97 S.Ct. at 2049. 
[2] A hard and fast rule that a prosecu-
tor must file charges as soon as he has 
probable cause could result in the charging 
of innocent persons. Such a rule could also 
result in the acquittal of guilty persons by 
hampering the investigation of crimes. 
Therefore, a prosecutor is not required to 
file charges as soon as probable cause ex-
ists but before the prosecutor is reasonably 
satisfied that he will be able to establish 
the supsect's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt Id. For preaccusation delay to con-
stitute reversible error, the delay must 
cause actual prejudice to the defendant's 
case and result in atactical advantage for 
the prosecutor. See~~Uniled STatefr^Re-
vada, 574 F.2d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir.1^78). 
[3,4] In thifc-raser-the- tria+xoUrt found 
that from October 1981 to March or April, 
1982, the police were engaged in gathering 
corroborative evidence. Although the de-
fendant disputes this finding, he cites no 
'i 
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contrary evidence and we are therefore 
compelled to accept it. The trial court 
ruled that there was no valid reason for the 
prosecutor's failure to file charges from 
March or April to September, except for 
the one month during which the prosecutor 
was on vacation. We do not agree that the 
vacation time of a prosecutor in a multiple 
prosecution office is a valid excuse for fail-
ing to file charges. Nevertheless, the 
court found, and the defendant does not 
dispute, that the prosecutor obtained no 
tactical advantage over the defendant be-
cause of the delay or prejudiced defendant 
by allowing the evidence to become prejudi-
cally stale. On the circumstances of this 
case we hold that the delay did not violate 
the defendant's right to a reasonably 
prompt filing of the charges against him. 
Affirmed. 
Elden C. KIMBALL, aka Eldon C. 
Kimball, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Lewis E. CAMPBELL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18904. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 27, 1985. 
Lienholder brought action against an-
other lienholder for breach of lien release 
agreement. The Second District Court, 
Weber County, John F. Walhquist, J., en-
tered judgment awarding plaintiff dam-
ages, and defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) 
parol evidence that explained parties' intent 
and did not contradict terms of written 
contract was properly considered, and (2) 
testimony by one lienholder was sufficient 
to support finding that delivery of lien re-
lease by him was not condition precedent to 
payment of $10,000 by other lienholder. 
Affirmed. 
©Contracts <s=»176(l) Contract's interpretation may be either 
a question of law, determined by the words 
of the agreement, or a question of fact, 
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent. 
2. Appeal and Error «=>842(8), 1008.1(10) 
If trial court interprets contract as a 
matter of law, Supreme Court accords its 
construction no particular weight, review-
ing its action under a correctness standard; 
however, if contract is not an integration or 
is ambiguous and trial court proceeds to 
find facts respecting the intentions of the 
parties based on extrinsic evidence, then 
review is strictly limited. 
3. Evidence e»450(5) 
Parol evidence which explained intent 
of parties to lien release agreement and did 
not contradict terms of written contract 
was properly considered where writing was 
ambiguous with respect to timeliness and 
order of parties' performance. 
4. Contracts «=>221(1) 
Whether a promise is conditional de-
pends upon parties' intent, which is derived 
from a fair and reasonable construction of 
the language used in light of all the circum-
stances when the parties executed the con-
tract. 
5. Contracts «=»176(9) 
Testimony by one lienholder was suffi-
cient to support finding that, under con-
tract, delivery of lien release by him was 
not condition precedent to payment of $10,-
000 by other lienholder. 
6. Set-Off and Counterclaim «=»60 
Counterclaim was compulsory and lien-
holder's failure to file counterclaim result-
ed in waiver of issue of whether he was 
damaged by other lienholder's alleged 
breach of lien release agreement, where 
counterclaim arose out of transaction that 
was subject matter of other lienholder's 
claim. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 13(a). 
R. Douglas Credille, T. Quentin Cannon, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant 
H. Ralph Klemm, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Lewis E. Campbell seeks re-
versal of a judgment awarding plaintiff 
Elden C. Kimball damages for breach of 
contract. Campbell argues that the trial 
court erred in considering parol evidence in 
interpreting the terms of a written agree-
ment between the parties. Campbell also 
seeks a remand in order to pursue a coun-
terclaim not asserted at trial for damages 
arising out of Kimball's alleged reciprocal 
breach of the contract. We hold that the 
trial court did not err in considering parol 
evidence and that the resulting findings 
and conclusions are supported by substan-
tial record evidence. We therefore affirm. 
We also find no basis for a remand. 
Both Kimball and Campbell held liens on 
a piece of real property known as "The 
Office." Both liens were lower in priority 
than at least one other lien on the property 
held by Murray First Thrift ("MFT").1 
MFT had scheduled a trustee's sale. Prior 
to the sale, Campbell purchased MFFs en-
tire interest in The Office, but decided to 
proceed with the trustee's sale to clear 
subsequent liens. 
These facts are undisputed. However, 
with minor exceptions, the remaining facts 
were the subject of directly conflicting tes-
timony between Campbell and Kimball. 
The trial court accepted Kimball's version. 
We recite the facts as found by the trial 
court 
At the January 22, 1981 sale, Campbell 
bid $43,000. To his surprise, Kimball then 
b
»d $45,000. Kimball had adequate credit 
* .***T w a s a trustee under two separate trust 
deeds. The first was dated July 10, 1978, in the 
amount of $30,162 and the second was dated 
M
*y 16, 1979, in the amount of $32,174. The 
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to permit him to complete the purchase at 
the $45,000 price. Campbell requested a 
delay in bidding and offered to pay Kimball 
$10,000 in consideration of the withdrawal 
of his bid. Kimball accepted. The auction-
eer then sold the property to Campbell by 
rejecting Kimball's higher bid upon the fic-
tional premise that he did not have the 
$45,000. 
After the sale, Kimball and Campbell 
drew up a rather cryptic agreement provid-
ing that Kimball would withdraw his $45,-
000 bid and execute and deliver a lien re-
lease on The Office "forthwith" and that in 
consideration, Campbell would pay Kimball 
$10,000 on or before February 13, 1981. 
The agreement was signed on January 22, 
1981, after counsel for both parties re-
viewed it. 
The trial court found that, at the time the 
agreement was signed, the parties intended 
that Kimball would execute and deliver the 
lien release as soon as Campbell tendered 
$10,000; that Kimball was at all times 
ready to give the release upon receipt of 
the $10,000; that Kimball contacted Camp-
bell's attorney several times to ask if the 
$10,000 was available and was told that it 
was not; and that Kimball eventually gave 
Campbell's attorney the lien release on or 
about February 15th so that there would be 
no hesitancy on Campbell's part to pay the 
$10,000. 
Kimball and Campbell were the only wit-
nesses at trial. Kimball testified to the 
facts as found by the trial court, while 
Campbell asserted that Kimball's obliga-
tion to furnish a release "forthwith" was a 
condition precedent to his obligation to pay 
the $10,000 and that his receipt of the lien 
release on or before February 1, 1981, was 
required by the term "forthwith." Kimball 
testified that there was no such under-
standing. In essence, the parties' charac-
terization of their intent regarding per-
formance under the contract was flatly 
contradictory. 
judgment lien held by plaintiff was docketed on 
April 16, 1979, in the amount of $35,000 and, 
therefore, apparently came between MFTs first 
and second liens on the property. 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Ronald Lynn VILES,' Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 20271. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 2, 1985. 
Prisoner was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, Miller County, David Sam, 
J., of escape from a state prison and theft 
of a vehicle. Prisoner appealed. The Su-
preme Court held that prisoner waj not 
denied his right to a speedy trial and pris-
oner's trial was held within 120-day time 
limit imposed by statute where prisoner's 
trial was held 112 days after prisoner's 
notice to warden of charges pending 
against him. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
STATE v. VILES Utah H 
Cite as 702 FM 1175 (Utah 1985) 
3. Criminal Law *=»577.9 
U.C.A. 1953, 77-29-1 which states tl 
prisoner serving term of imprisonment 
entitled to have charge brought to ti 
within 120 days of prisoner's delivery 
custodial officer of written notice reque 
ing disposition of pending charge plac 
burden on prisoner to give notice to ward 
before prisoner is entitled to have t 
charge disposed of within the statutory i 
riod of time. 
4. Criminal Law <&=>577.9 
For purposes of determining wheth 
prisoner was denied right to a speedy trii 
120-day time limit imposed by U.C.A.196 
77-29-1 did not commence on prisoner 
notice of appearance where the noti< 
merely contained a plea of not guilty and 
request that prisoner be granted a trial ar 
did not comport with statutory requiremei 
of delivery to warden and did not specii 
the nature of the charge or the court whei 
the charge was pending. U.S.C.A. Cons 
Amend. 6. 
1. Criminal Law «=»577.5 
/> Purpose of U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1 which 
tates that prisoner serving a term of im-
* prisonment is entitled to have charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of prison-
^ er's delivery to custodial officer of written 
notice requesting disposition of pending 
charge is to protect the constitutional right 
of prisoners to a speedy trial and to compel 
law enforcement authorities to properly 
prosecute charges against prisoners. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
2. Criminal Law «=»577.5 
Legislative expression of time limits 
that constitute a speedy public trial under 
State Constitution are represented in U.C. 
A. 1953, 77-29-1 which states that prisoner 
serving term of imprisonment is entitled to 
have the charge brought to trial within 120 
days of prisoner's delivery to custodial offi-
cer of written notice requesting disposition 
of pending charge. 
Milton T. Harman, Nephi, for defendar 
and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lak 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals from the judgment oi 
a jury verdict convicting him of escap< 
from the state prison, a second degree felo 
ny in violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-8-
309(1) and § 76-8-309(2Xb) (1978 ed.), an< 
theft of a vehicle, a second degree felony ii 
violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404 anc 
§ 76-6-412(lXaXii) (1978 ed.). We affirm 
Defendant was a prisoner of the Utal 
State Prison housed at the Millard Count} 
Jail for work release from that facility 
when he escaped in a stolen vehicle. He 
was recaptured and returned to the county 
jail on April 22, 1984. Throughout tht 
following month his attorney filed a notice 
of appearance, made request for discovery, 
and filed motions to reduce charge and 
sever counts. On May 30, 1984, defendant 
delivered his "notice and request for dispo 
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sition of pending charges" to the Utah 
State Prison. On June 30, he filed his 
motion to dismiss the action for failure to 
prosecute in a timely manner. The motion 
was denied. Trial was held on September 
20. 
The single issue before this court is 
based upon defendant's claim that he was 
denied his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial. Defendant maintains that the notice 
of appearance filed on April 24, 1984, con-
stituted notice provided for in section 77-
29-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 
that his trial was not held until 150 days 
from the filing of that notice. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-29-1 (1978 ed.) reads: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a 
term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correc-
tional institution of this state, and 
there is pending against the prisoner 
in this state any untried indictment or 
information, and the prisoner shall 
deliver to the warden, sheriff or cus-
todial officer in authority, or any ap-
propriate agent of the same, a writ-
ten demand specifying the nature of 
the charge and the court wherein it is 
pending and requesting disposition of 
the pending charge, he shall be enti-
tled to have the charge brought to 
trial within 120 days of the date of 
delivery of written notice. 
/ [ l t2J The purpose of the statute is to 
protect the constitutional right of prisoners 
to a speedy trial and to compel law enforce-
ment authorities to promptly prosecute 
charges against prisoners. State v. Velas-
quez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115 (1982); State v. 
Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158 
(1969) (stating the same purpose under for-
mer statute). This statutory scheme repre-
sents a legislative expression of the time 
limits that constitute a speedy public trial 
under the Utah Constitution. State v. Tay-
lor, Utah, 538 P.2d 310 (1975), and the 120 
day period commences to run from the date 
of delivery of the written notice. Section 
77-29-1, supra. 
[3,4] Defendant's reliance on his notice 
of appearance to commence the running of 
the 120-day period is misplaced. The notice 
merely contained a plea of "not guilty" and 
a request that defendant be granted a trial 
upon the charge. It did not comport with 
the requirements of the statute, as it was 
not delivered to the warden at the state 
prison and did not specify the nature of the 
charge or the court where the charge was 
pending. Section 77-29-1 places the bur-
den on the prisoner to give notice to the 
warden before he is entitled to have the 
charge disposed of within the statutory pe-
riod of time. That was done on May 30, 
1984. His trial was held 112 days later on 
September 20 and was well within the time 
set to guarantee him a speedy public trial. 
Affirmed. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
ALL WEATHER INSULATION, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
AMIRON DEVELOPMENT CORP., et 
al., Defendants, Respondents, and 
Cross-Appellants. 
No. 19530. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 3, 1985. 
Corporation brought action to collect 
for materials furnished for condominium 
construction project against record owner 
of property, general contractor for project, 
lender and trustee-beneficiary under trust 
deed, and various individuals and small 
businesses who had filed materialmen's 
liens or mechanic's liens against property. 
The Seventh District Court, Uintah County, 
Richard C. Davidson, J., ruled that trust 
deed had priority over all lien claimants. 
ALL WEATHER INSULATION v. A 
Cite as 702 P.2d 
Corporation and some of the defendants 
appealed. The Supreme Court held that: 
(1) purported appeal was not from final 
appealable order, where claims of breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment, and failure to 
obtain construction bond, as well as validity 
of liens and amounts secured by liens re-
mained to be adjudicated, and (2) appeal 
therefore had to be dismissed and matter 
remanded to trial court, where parties had 
not availed themselves of procedures which 
permit appeal of fewer than all claims or 
parties but only after District Court certifi-
cation, and review of interlocutory order 
had not been granted. 
Appeal dismissed; remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error e=>358 
Parties to suit generally are entitled to 
only one appeal as matter of right, regard-
less of number of parties or issues present-
ed for disposition. 
2. Appeal and Error «=>66 
Appeal can be taken only from entry 
of judgment that finally concludes action. 
3. Appeal and Error <s=»80(3) 
Purported appeal was not from final 
appealable order, where claims of breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment, and failure to 
obtain construction bond, as well as validity 
of liens and amounts secured by liens re-
mained to be adjudicated, even though dis-
trict court's summary judgment established 
lenders' priority over lien claimants' inter-
ests. 
4. Appeal and Error «=>358, 366 
Appeal, which was not from final ap-
pealable order, had to be dismissed and 
matter remanded to trial court, where par-
ties had not availed themselves of Civil 
Rule 54(b) procedures which permit appeal 
of fewer than all claims or parties but only 
after district court certification, and review 
of interlocutory order had not been granted 
by the Supreme Court. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rules 54(b), 72(b); Rules App.Proc., Rule 5. 
MIRON DEVELOP. CORP. Utah H 
176 (Utah 1985) 
Joseph R. Fox, Sandy, Gary H. Weij 
Provo, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Bruce A. Maak, Salt Lake City, for 
fendants, respondents, and cross-ap] 
lants. 
PER CURIAM: 
In August, 1982, plaintiff filed this acti 
to collect for materials furnished for a cc 
dominium construction project in Verm 
Utah. The parties named as defendan 
included the following: Amiron Develo 
ment Corp., the record owner of the prope 
ty; Herbert Bales, the general contract* 
for the project; Basin State Bank, the lem 
er and trustee-beneficiary under a trus 
deed;' and various individuals and sma 
businesses who had filed materialmen' 
liens or mechanic's liens against the propei 
ty. The four causes of action specified ii 
the complaint were (1) lien foreclosure, (2 
breach of contract, (3) failure to obtaii 
bond, and (4) quantum meruit. Following i 
series of answers, counterclaims, anc 
cross-claims, the lenders filed a motion for 
summary judgment. After reviewing 
memoranda and pleadings (including affida-
vits), the district court ruled that the trust 
deed has priority over all lien claimants 
since it was recorded on August 4, 1981, 
and the "first visible work performed on 
the job site" occurred after that date. 
Separate notices of appeal were there-
after filed by plaintiff and by some of the 
other defendants. Briefs on appeal focus 
primarily on whether there exists a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to when con-
struction on the site actually began. We 
do not address the merits of the appeal 
since it is not from a final order. 
[1-3] Parties to a suit generally are en-
titled to only one appeal as a matter of 
right, regardless of the number of parties 
or issues presented for dispostion. An ap-
peal can be taken only from the entry of a 
1. Two other lending institutions were also 
named as assignees of part of the beneficial 
interest of Basin State Bank. 
j 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*********** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 911400609 
vs. 
WILLIAM IRA LEON, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendant. 
************ 
The Court having received the defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
hereby denies such motion. The Court finds that defendant's 
request for final disposition pursuant to Rule 77-29-1 UCA was 
premature, because at the time of the filing there were no 
indictments or information pending against the prisoner in this 
state. State v. Farnsworth 519 P.2d 244 (Utah 1974). 
The Court finds further that defendant's demand was 
deficient because it did not specify the nature of the charge in 
the Court where it is pending as required by Rule 77-29-1 UCA. 
Counsel for the plaintiff to prepare an order within 15 days 
of this decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to 
submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision 
has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 4th day of February, 1992. 
cc: Mark Brady, Esq. 
D. John Mussleman, Esq. 
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